ADDRESS OR INTIMATION?

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Works of art allegedly address specific people, but how do they do that? And do they address one personally or only as a specimen of a group of people? Lastly, and most importantly, how does the addressing combine with their success as a work of art?

Richard Wollheim recently gave this characterization of communication: “What I mean by communication is the attempt, or, more narrowly perhaps, the successful attempt, on the part of an agent to instil certain beliefs, or—a weaker version of the same idea—certain speculations, or suggestions, or hopes, or suspicions, into the mind or minds of an audience. The agent may identify the audience with which he intends to communicate to varying degrees of specificity, but he must identify it with sufficient specificity for it to make sense for him to try to adapt the means of communication he uses so as to achieve the success he desires. Specifically he must, if there is to be communication, adapt how he puts

things to the cognitive stock that he believes his audience to possess.”¹ There is no need for art to address people in this manner, that is, art is at best only contingently based in communication.

I am assuming the following distinction between communication and art. Whatever other properties a communication may have—be these moral, epistemological or aesthetic in nature—they are secondary as to its efficacy in getting the aimed for other to ‘get the message’. Following Wollheim’s characterization, not only is communication directed at getting a specific message across; it also aims this message at a particular audience which possesses the right kind of knowledge, i.e. one which shares an appropriate cognitive stock. Wollheim argues that although both communication and art presuppose a cognitive stock in their audience, they do so in distinct ways. A communicator addresses his audience because of the persons it consists of—and in this he implies that these persons possess the relevant cognitive stock. An artist, to the contrary, addresses no-one in particular but merely assumes a cognitive stock for the significance of his work to emerge, and only since people of certain kinds may be seen to possess that cognitive stock can the artist be seen to address them specifically. However, his addressing these people is contingent on their having acquired the relevant cognitive stock. In the case of art the audience is defined nominally, so to speak, whereas in communication its definition is realistic.

Notwithstandingly, there is a reciprocal connection between the addresor and the addressee both in communication and art. Whereas with communication this reciprocity may be all too evident, we find that there is one involved in art as well. The artist through his work induces the beholder to mobilize his cognitive stock and the beholder does exactly that in order to bring the work’s meaning to life. Abstracting from the case of communication, then, let us take a closer look at the reciprocal addressing of a work and its beholder. This reciprocity comes in at least two forms. First, there are characteristics pertaining to the medium of the work, or to the period, genre or school against whose background the work is produced. In short, a work is embedded in the general stylistics which art history applies to it in order to bring it under the relevant headings.² Knowledge of these general stylistic properties forms part of the cognitive stock that is pre-

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supposed for an adequate understanding of any work of art. Appealing to this, Anthony Savile, in his classical book on *The Test of Time*, argues that works of art are to be understood in terms of the primary aesthetic which explains how a particular style or genre demands certain artistic gestures, while forbidding others.³ This position seems also to identify the cognitive stock that Wollheim deems necessary for art appreciation. However, for a communicator it is not enough to merely assume the presence of such a cognitive stock in his audience: he must also, realistically, assume the persons themselves who possess that stock and are able to mobilize it. I submit that intimation is an artistic effect which must be posited— theoretically speaking—right between the general addressing of an artwork and the personal addressing characteristic of communication. It presupposes the general type of cognitive stock which Savile and Wollheim refer to, but, on top, it also addresses a very personal type of cognitive stock in the audience—even though the artist has no means available to establish just where this personal stock were to consist in.⁴ Intimation is the second type of reciprocity that is going on between a work and its beholder.⁵

I conceive of the artistic merit of a work of art in function of how its meaning fits the natural expression that inheres the material which the work consists of. I am deliberately using this term “natural expression”, although it has been restricted, among others by Wollheim or, in different terms, Peter Kivy, to the expression in face and gestures of a human being in the presence of his beholder. But natural expression in the standardly restricted sense, in a way, is a hybrid concept in that what a person’s face and gestures express shall be a mixture of what his physiology is naturally, genetically even, endowed with and the style, partly of his own choosing, with which he wants to address other people surrounding him. The expression on our faces is, and yet isn’t, transparent to our mental lives. The way a style fits one’s physiology is greatly determinant of one’s resultant expression. Understanding the work of art along these lines is instructive in itself al-

³ Savile argues here against the so-called hermeneutic circle which assumes that our understanding of a work should be circular because it presupposes our standards and assumably projects these on art from previous times. Savile, Anthony, *The Test of Time*, Oxford 1982, p. 75-79.


⁵ One might also think in this context of Wollheim’s notion of expression as projection. However, I have argued elsewhere that artistic expression should better be taken to be an instance of representation (of phenomenal consciousness), and so I do not think that projection, as Wollheim understands it, will do the job.
ready. Yet, I even think that the analogy also explains the very relevance of art. Imposing mind on something non-sentient, or in the case of human performers: the protagonist’s mind onto the mind of the actor, dancer or performer, is really our way of wondering about our own powers of expression.\(^6\) Just how exactly an artist’s individual style can be marked off from the expression of his material can be grasped by this comparison with how an individual tries to fit his lifestyle (or merely his style of dressing, or his style of addressing) onto the natural powers of expression that he finds himself endowed with.

This thought may not be new, but it surely needs restating. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing discussed the idea of material expressiveness without the argument of analogy in the eighteenth century, when he suggested that a sculpture somehow already is implied in the stone and that the sculptor supposedly merely has to excavate it.\(^7\) To give some more examples, Catherine Lord applied the argument in assessing the Kripkean framework of rigid designation to the ontology of art,\(^8\) and Martin Heidegger applied it in his rather mystifying and perhaps even mystical contrast between the earth and the world of a work,\(^9\) and Bruce Vermazen and Jerrold Levinson, lastly, either explicitly or implicitly showed us the need for introducing the analogue with a person’s natural expression.\(^10\) I shall stick to my present audience, though, and merely refer to two notions which Richard Wollheim introduced in the past, which I find highly congenial. The first one is the twofoldness of our perception of pictures. According to this notion there is always a something in which we see the depicted. That something is the picture plane, the paint on the canvas, through which the artist realizes his intentions.\(^11\) The second notion is that of individual style—which Wollheim opposes to general, classificatory, types of style.\(^12\)

In meritorious paintings the beholder may be drawn to the style as well

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\(^7\) Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, Laokoon oder die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie, Stuttgart 1964 (1766).
\(^9\) In Heidegger, Martin, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Stuttgart 1960.
as the subject matter. Looking at a Rembrandt self-portrait has us watch both the depicted man and the paint which depicts him.\(^{13}\) But now imagine a bad painting. Here the analysis of the twofold nature of painting ought to hold as well, because twofoldness is a descriptive, not an evaluative notion, and apparently fits our perception of every painted representation. Only now, the twofolded attention that is demanded by the work leaves us in a spasm. We feel that watching the paint does not in any way deepen our perceptual understanding of the subject it depicts, or worse still. A bad painting would illustrate theoretically that twofoldness is a correct way to think about our perception of representations, but also that it can be used to make the evaluational point that in a great work of art these elements of our perceiving are mutually enhancing. The style enhances the expression that inheres the material, and the other way around; and both enhance the life of the subject matter.

Artistic excellence, I submit, relates to how in a work style and expression fit together. The fit between style and expression is not just a coincidental connection between two commensurable elements, but is motivated by a striving to implicate the beholder with the work’s meaning. Of this, intimation is an exemplary instance—I shall, therefore, treat intimation as the model for the urge to either produce art or, more generally, have it as a domain of culture.\(^{14}\) I conceive of intimation as the representation of phenomenal consciousness, i.e. of what it is like to be in some situation or other.\(^{15}\) I shall explain this in a while and shall then give you a clear example. Intimation has to do with the expression which inheres the material of the work, the style that the artist has molded this material into, and lastly, the cognitive stock the beholder is successfully asked to mobilize in order


\(^{14}\) The impetus behind ever new Avant-Garde movements can be seen as another instance, as can the movement for authentic instrumentation in classical music, etcetera. I see intimation also as the model for understanding what distinguishes a work of art from a non-artistic artifact. That should provide us with an alternative to Danto’s assumption that artworld theories are what account for the relevant distinction. Cf. Danto, Arthur, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, A Philosophy of Art*, Cambridge, Mass. 1981; ‘The End of Art’, in Lang, B. (ed.), *The Death of Art*, New York 1984, 5-35; and *After the End of Art*, Princeton, New Jersey 1997.

\(^{15}\) To experience how it feels to be in some situation or other implies having a phenomenally conscious mental state of it. Such phenomenally conscious states of mind must be possessed by someone; and others, to fully understand them, must be sure to take the perspective of that consciousness into account. Cf. Michael Tye in *Ten Problems of Consciousness* used these (and eight more) characteristics to develop a representational theory of consciousness. These two characteristics suffice for the present purposes.
to adequately appreciate the work. Intimation and artistic merit go hand in hand.\textsuperscript{16} And this is of interest because intimation is a reciprocity between work and beholder and what I am looking at here is whether the notion of address has an explanatory use in the context of art as well. We are, by the way, not just talking about the artist’s intentions now, but about these intentions as they are realized in the material.

And my point is that the accordance between the artist’s individual style and the natural expression which inheres his material is indicative of the artistic merit of the resultant work. This means, firstly, that the cognitive stock that is definitive of the adequate observer concerns both of these elements of style and expression, and, secondly, that it concerns them both in \textit{the light of} the effect of intimation, or its likes.\textsuperscript{17}

But how do we keep apart the artist’s style and the expression that already inheres the material? I shall give you an example taken from the music of free jazz pioneer Albert Ayler.\textsuperscript{18} It is a rendition of \textit{Summertime}, a classical tune (which has been interpreted, I believe, several hundreds of times). The material Ayler is working with comprises the notes of the song, the improvisatory means that go with the musical genre of free jazz, and of course, the properties of the peculiar saxophone he is using and of his own physiology.\textsuperscript{19} What we hear in the example is Ayler laying out a road through this material and treading it. We hear citations of the tune and squeecks and grumbles from the man. We the listeners mobilize our knowledge of the tune and our acquaintance with jazz or perhaps even with free jazz. And what we hear is how Ayler’s individual style fits perfectly with the expressive challenges of his material.\textsuperscript{20} What is more, I submit that even those with a dislike for jazz shall be able to discern the artistic merits of Ayler’s rendition of \textit{Summertime}.  

\textsuperscript{16} I.e. sucessful intimation is a sufficient condition for artistic merit, and it is a necessary condition for the merit of works that aim at representing consciousness.

\textsuperscript{17} I realize that art forms address our sensuous apparatus in specific ways and that this seems to turn works into a kind of moral agents. I cannot go into this here.

\textsuperscript{18} Ayler, Albert, \textit{My Name is Albert Ayler}, Recorded in Copenhagen 1963, Black Lion 1995.


\textsuperscript{20} Maybe the merit of Ayler’s performance is not characterizable as intimation in that no identifyable phenomenal consciousness is being represented - obviously, this is debatable as the demand of identifyability may be too stringent. Cf. Levinson, “Musical Expressiveness”. What is not debatable is that Ayler by performing the music as he does implicates the listener with the musical event, and that, counter to Scruton’s rigid phenomenology of sound (\textit{The Aesthetics of Music}, 13-15) his physique is audible in the music.
Ayer is playful in his interpretation. He provides enough clues for us to recognize just what tune he is playing, but introjects a lot of comments on his part, rather personal comments too, albeit musically formed ones; we can hear the man blow his saxophone, we can hear his breathing technique. The man himself is present in his music. This might be my favourite example of a work which realizes the artist’s intentions. But maybe, one day, our access to this work’s artistic merits gets forelorn, who knows? When will the cognitive stock that we need to mobilize to bring this piece of music to life have gone awry? When will this music have become *dated*? Or will it ever?

I assume that great works of art carry their own framework with them. They force our interpretation upon us. In fact, what I am talking about is the test of time. Surviving the test of time means surviving the consecutive judgements of true critics, as Hume, for instance, saw it. Hume gave this test a nominal delineation and almost turned it into a procedural means to assess a work’s greatness. I appreciate the strength of this. Hume’s example of Sancho Panza’s kinsmen shows how it can be rather hard to convince your contemporaries of the correctness of your judgements, whereas after a few generations any such troubles may have evaporated. Time will have taken care of them. Panza’s kinsmen are asked to taste a wine and while they both acknowledge that it is a great wine they both identify a flaw in it. One of them subtly discerns a flavour of iron, while the other thinks he is tasting a leathery taste. The audience in the tavern laughs out loud, finds them silly, assuming that the wine is just splendid. However, no sooner is the barrel emptied or, at the bottom of it a key with a ‘leathern thong’ is found (355). That is, after all fashionable and personal matters have dissolved, the truth of the matter has eventually surfaced. Hume has been taken to defend the thesis that all beauty is like the taste of wine, in the object to be discerned by good eyes and ears, as if beauty were a secondary quality. However, his point rather is that it is difficult to form the right judgements of taste, because not only does being a great critic require subtle mental and perceptual capacities and the will to exercise these through practical comparison, it also requires that one fight his own prejudices, as

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21 There is nothing wrong with this apparent circularity - it merely points to the response-dependence of artistic values. What I merely want to point out is, that a work’s merits should be its own doing, not ours - even though our appreciative perception may involve a concentrated reciprocated activity on our behalf.

well those prevalent in his times. This, in fact, turns the test of time into a negative criterion. The test is needed only because we should be so unsecure about the judgements of our contemporaries. The test entails no proof of beauty nor an ongoing development or teleology of beauty.

Hume thinks that perhaps there are two ways to find a more positive answer to the problem of aesthetic evaluation. One is, zooming in on the mental powers needed to discern beauty, the other is looking at the judgements formed by good critics and see how they stand up to the test of time. He chose the latter because of the problems encountered by the former strategy, such as an irremediable kind of circularity (how to identify the relevant mental powers without presupposing what they are supposed to prove, to wit that they are proof of the correct exercise of taste). But no work can stand the test of time if its merit were wholly dependent on its historical context and later generations would be incapable of retrieving it. So we might want to rephrase the test of time in terms of the cognitive stock a work requires.

I propose to try to realistically fill in Hume’s nominal conception of the standard of taste, as follows: a work of art that stood the test of time, has thus proven to carry its own framework with it, and does not depend for its merits to emerge on the accidental input from fashion, conventions or habits typical of a group of contemporaries. The opposite of a justified critical assessment is a sentimental or elitist one, which, falsely, depends on such external considerations. According to Savile, in The Test of Time, “a sentimental mode of thought is typically one that idealizes its object under the guidance of a desire for gratification and reassurance.” Our judgements are sentimental if, and insofar as, they are not motivated by properties of the object under consideration, but, rather, by a desire for gratification which should in fact be neutral as to whether or not the thing judged deserves our judgement: we merely utter the judgement for the help we expect to get from it in creating a better image of ourselves.

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23 Malcolm Budd rightly points at an ambiguity with regard to the verdicts of Panza’s kinsmen, in that their verdict about the overall quality of the wine is not in the same manner legitimated as their discernment of the shades of taste. The latter merely assumes their senses to be addressed, the former assumes the exercise of taste. Since Hume is after a standard for taste, this is no small flaw. Budd, Malcolm, Values of Art, Pictures, Poetry and Music, London, etc. 1995, p. 23.

24 See Gadamer, “Ästhetik und Hermeneutik”, for the argument that all experiences of some work are contemporaneous. (Translation into Dutch, in Feit & fictie, V:2, 2001, 111-119).

The distinction between justified judgements of artistic merit and sentimental ones, however, is a gradual one. However, it may need time—Hume saw this very clearly—to make out if and to what extent a specific judgement is justified. In case our judgements are fully justified by the properties of the work they answer to norms of appropriateness. In case they are sentimental they answer to considerations that have insufficient bearing on the work—in any intermediate case both appropriate considerations will be implied in our judgements and sentimental ones. I love to believe that my appraisal of Ayler’s rendition of Summertime is not sentimental, but, curiously, whenever I present the example to an audience I feel deeply embarrassed. As if listening en groupe has my audience listen in on a personal experience, on something that is all mine, and not communicable at all.

My interest is with the kinds of relevance of some considerations whose appropriateness cannot easily be ascertained. Great works of art are in the habit of implicating their audience. Successful twofoldness—let us use this term for the evaluative usage of twofoldness—is not just a mutual enhancement of material and subject, but one which implies a regulated stimulation of the beholder’s imagination. This is harder to explain with an art form like painting than it is through cinema, but one might think of the brush as inducing us to introduce certain associations regarding the painter Rembrandt and how his embodied mind is responsible for just this appearance the portrayed has been given. Successful twofoldness not only enriches our experience of the image, it also shows how the painter lived up to his subject. This it does by activating our imagination. Successful twofoldness awaits our imagination to bring the work to life.26 Thus, we are part of the enlivening factor of a work of art.27 For the record, it is not up to our imagination to make up whatever we see fit to project. It is up to the work to tell which associations fit and which don’t. The meritorious work guides our imagination—the work is in charge. Although it leaves things to the imagination, it is also quite positive about how this is supposed to fill in the lacunas. Thus, an element of beholders’ contribution

26 I don’t mean that the work is not finished by the artist but needs the beholder to finish it. The work is finished alright, it merely needs the beholder to actualize it.

27 I am aware that Wollheim has the rather more restricted concept of imagination of phantasy in mind. He argues that at least some of the things I have our imagination construe are straightforwardly seen in the work. I cannot go into this now, but see my “Expression as Representation”, in Gerwen, R. v. (ed.), Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting. Art as Representation and Expression, New York, etc. 2001, 135-50.
is involved in artistic merit. This personal contribution is not of a sentimental kind, nor does it merely point to the general art historical cognitive stock that is presupposed for a beholder to come adequately equipped to the work.

In intimation, both the nature of the work and the assumed properties of the beholder are more or less fixed, but there is no other way to point out the inti-matory success of a work than by referring to the plausibility of the beholder’s own empathetic experience, because the cognitive stock that is necessary for intimation to work is of a personal nature. It is the beholder’s answer to the psychological reality which, according to Wollheim, pertains to individual style. Yet to address this personal stock is not a case of communication since an artist is incapable to know beforehand what is going to be in it, with each of his work’s beholders. Which is one of the reasons why he is leaving things open for his audience to fill in. Instead, all he can do is guide the beholder on to the vacant spot in his work where the beholder’s imagination is supposed to take over. Let me give you an example.

In a scene near the end of Robert Bresson’s *L’argent* (1983), a man and his wife have an argument over a criminal the woman is hiding in their shack. Previous scenes have quickly acquainted us with this couple as kind and caring persons, sharing an okay life together, and even Yvon, the criminal attests to their gentleness. The relevant scene takes place as the woman is taking a large cup of black coffee to the criminal and meets her husband on the garden path. He tells her he’ll call the police; she tells him not to; he calls her a fool. We see this in a typical shot-countershot way, with alternating shots of the two faces. But when we see the anticipation in the woman’s gaze of how the man is going to slap her, the director cuts to a shot of the shaking coffee cup she’s carrying. We hear the slap, and since the montage is not discontinuous—i.e. the shot of the dancing cup is shown as causally connected with the woman being hit—perceptually speaking,

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28 But indeed, only one of them. The major reason lies, I think, in his effort to implicate the audience.
29 Robert Bresson has made emptying his images of ‘actorial’ meanings into a stylistic element. His stories are told through montage, or, more specifically, through intimation. In *L’argent*, all existentially crucial events are conveyed by intimation. We are shown the impulsive rage of Yvon (the main protagonist) through the sliding of the skimmer he threw away for being ashamed of his rage. Yvon’s attempted suicide is shown through his fellow inmates’ watching an ambulance leave the courtyard (after Bresson informed us by a single shot how Yvon did not take his sleeping pills but hid them under his tongue). Yvon’s butchering of a whole family is shown through the sound and image of a dog running wildly up and down the stairs, a lamp being kicked over and a swinging axe. And lastly, his arrest is shown through the people in the pub in which he was arrested, staring after him as he is taken away. See also Bresson, *Notes sur le cinématographe*, Paris: Gallimard, 1975.
the event is conveyed successfully. We *perceive* the slap—we do not make it up—but we don’t actually *see* it. However, perceiving-while-not-seeing is not what the audience expects, and as a consequence, it fills the gaps in the representation with associations of its own. But it is not as though the imagination is caused to fill in the visual marks of the event and produce a proposition stating the event—it is nothing as straightforward as that. Instead, the imagination is hinted at its own freedom and induced to activate it for the sake of empathy. Yet we are not merely making up some experiential event. What our imagination comes up with is what we might expect to get had the depicted event been a real life confrontation. We get to grasp what it is like for the protagonists to experience the events represented—even though we do not necessarily identify with them. (This is not about identification with the hero of a picture). We empathize with these two caring people and come to imagine the impact the slap may have on their lives. The mental and moral scope of the event thus become intimate to us the audience. We do not merely recognize what is happening, but actively engage with it. The impact is known by acquaintance. Lastly, these felt moral and experiential aspects are not merely in us, but belong to the work; they are not merely evoked in us, or projected by us onto the work: the work *represents* them. Intimation is the type of representation which not only implicates the beholder in an artificially induced reciprocity which nears the real-life second-personal one between two people; it also shows forth the respect which phenomenal consciousness deserves. It is, arguably, art’s way of presenting the humanity of consciousness. But intimation, like artistic excellence, is a gradual solution: it may well be the culprit for our needing a test of time.

My initial question was: to what extent can some work lay claim to be addressing a *specific* cognitive stock? I have argued that a general cognitive stock is pertinent, but how personal can this stock get? From the point of view of art and the subtle interplay of reciprocal addressing that is going on in intimation, senti-

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30 Varieties of addressing involve (person-to-person) communication, which assumes a realistic definition of the addressee; and reports, which assume a nominalist definition of the addressee in terms of the cognitive stock presupposed for understanding the report. Propaganda (and moralism) and art can be seen to take up middle positions between these two extremes in that they both address the nominally defined addressee in a personal way. The difference though between propaganda (and moralism) and art is striking, and very instructive as to the question of their respective moral evaluation. Whereas art merely assumes the beholder’s personal stock as part of the cognitive stock that is required for him to grasp a work’s meaning, propaganda (and moralism) demand a specific personal stock from otherwise nominally defined addressees. Hesitantly, I situate feminist address as analyzed by Ellen Rooney in the category of propaganda (moralism). Cf. Rooney, Ellen, ‘What’s the Story? Feminist Theory, Narrative, Address’, in *Differences. A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 8 (1) 1-30.
mentality and communication may have a striking resemblance. As a model for art they may both claim or, respectively, assume too much agreement in the cognitive stock of the audience. Great works of art are so much more modest. I think they ought to be fostered as if one’s own life depended on them. Perhaps it even does.