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THE LINGUISTIC TURNABOUT

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In his “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” Freud discusses some technical problems the analyst faces in trying to treat his patients in ways that are timely and that also stand the tests of time. It is not enough to guard against the return of the patient’s conflict, Freud says. The analyst must also guard against its possible replacement by *another* conflict. But how to do this? How to turn a latent conflict into a currently active one so that it can be brought to a head? Through transference, yes, but transference can only do so much:

“This therefore leaves only one method open to us - the one which was in all probability the only one originally contemplated. We tell the patient about the possibilities of other instinctual conflicts, and we arouse his expectation that such conflicts may occur in him. What we hope is that this information and this warning will have the effect of activating in him one of the conflicts we have indicated, in a modest degree and yet sufficiently for treatment. But this time experience speaks with no uncertain voice. The expected result does not come

about. The patient hears our message, but there is no response. He may think to himself: 'This is very interesting, but I feel no trace of it.' We have increased his knowledge, but altered nothing else in him. The situation is much the same as when people read psycho-analytic writings. The reader is 'stimulated' only by those passages which he feels apply to himself - that is, which concern conflicts that are active in him at the time. Everything else leaves him cold" (233).

I want to move for a few minutes from people who read psychoanalytic writings to people who read contemporary cultural criticism. As an editor of a journal that calls itself a journal of feminist cultural studies, who reads many manuscripts in the loosely defined area of cultural studies, I must confess that much of what I read leaves me cold. Occasionally there are papers that seem to address my interests. But whether I'm engaged or left cold is all a matter of chance. And yet the solution to the problem, I would suggest, is not to hope that the odds improve. For even when my interests are addressed, they are - like the passive voice I am using - merely addressed. The cultural studies manuscript seeks the engaged reader. Once it finds her, it will argue, persuade, and even charm, but it assumes its reader in advance.

(A word about the term "cultural studies": Since there is no fixed field of cultural studies in the US, the term has come to take on a broad meaning, which is another way of saying that it can mean different things to different people. I am using the term in what I consider a descriptive way to refer to disciplinary or interdisciplinary work that takes language as a foundational category of analysis in order to display some aspect of the workings of culture, and that draws generally from the thematics of postmodernism.)

The form of writing common to cultural studies, the cultural studies address that tends to leave me cold, is quite different from the writing that characterizes poststructuralist criticism. The poststructuralist text has work to do just as the cultural studies text does - literary criticism, cultural criticism, philosophical argument - but that work takes place not so much in an expository register as at the level of textual engagement, meaning the textual engagement both of texts and of readers. The type of textual engagement differs from writer to writer; it is as different as the styles and techniques of Derrida, Barthes, Lacan, Irigaray, Deleuze, Althusser, and Foucault. What is common is that the writers do their

work by reading the workings of texts: the circulation of signification in those texts, but also the texts' resistances and blindspots, one might say the texts' latent conflicts. The reader who enters into such a reading doesn't know in advance where she will go. It is not that one brings nothing to the reading; it's that the experience of the text, like the experience of psychoanalysis, has - famously - no outside. One begins where one begins. And once the reader begins to read, there is no escape from the address of the text. The address does not bring with it a message - as Derrida says in *Postcard* - but neither can it leave one cold. The reader of the reading has no choice but to be "stimulated," as in Freud's sense of the word; the reader addressed by the text can experience frustration and incomprehension but there is nothing cold about those feelings.

It is these differences in reading experiences between cultural studies and poststructuralist writings that frame my larger project. I wouldn't deny that my thinking about the project is propelled by a personal desire for writing that is more stimulating and less chilling. But lest I fall into a nostalgia for lost pleasures, let me say that I am also propelled by a question that has to do with the very commonality of poststructuralist and cultural criticism, a commonality that puts their differences into relief. There are, indeed, many differences between the two: fortunately we do not stay mired in the same set of questions and problems decade after decade. But for all of the differences, both are a product of the same so-called "linguistic turn." If cultural criticism leaves much of post-structuralism behind, it does retain a sense of language as fundamental to its enterprise. So how is it that the French writings that Americans call "poststructuralist" and the American writings that I am calling cultural studies, can both be so strongly oriented toward language yet so different in their mode of address?

For cultural studies, language is understood as a differentiating system of meaning with a number of incarnations (discourse being one of the privileged). As the foundation of cultural studies, language is the guarantor of the "cultural"; and in spite of current arguments about the limits of "constructivism," it is still language that is meant to reassure that all is in motion. Taking on a bit of the flavor of a distant existentialism, cultural criticism sees itself as a hedge against the threat of a petrifying Necessity. It sees itself as a progressive criticism, a criticism that directs itself toward change. Moreover, the centrality of language as a category of analysis, so fervently resisted in earlier decades, has in recent years become a kind of interdisciplinary common ground in the US. A number of disciplines

have made the cultural studies turn, bringing analyses of language in one form or another to bear on such fields as history, economics, sociology, and political theory, and causing other fields, such as literature and anthropology, to look at language differently.

If we look to the connection between the language of cultural studies and the turn to language that drove the extraordinary production of structuralist and poststructuralist work in the decades from the 1950s into the early 80s, what do we find? Are there indeed connections? Consider once more the differences. In poststructuralist writing, language is the very scene of signification, whereas in cultural criticism an outside emerges: there, language is the *ground* of culture and as such not the scene of signification outside of which nothing, but merely the privileged category of analysis. Consider also the difference concerning the question of the subject: the poststructuralist subject is an effect of language, not transparent to itself, always already split and always driven through language to an imaginary coherence that can never hold. By contrast, the postmodern subject of cultural studies has a conscious relationship to itself and to the language in which it exists; it is fragmented; it celebrates fragmentation; and it resists a passive role in language - or discourse - through a performative mode.

One need only recall the exuberant declarations of death made by the French writers of the 60s - the death of man, the death of the subject, the author, the book - to realize how far we have come from their anti-humanist project. Cultural studies are a more comfortable place, less the place where language displaces the subject from itself and renders Man obsolete than where the subject finds its truths of fragmentation, its mobile meanings. One can imagine the reasons the French writers themselves might give for this demise of the demise: for Derrida, the fault would lie with too little rigor, for Barthes, too little pleasure, for Foucault the reduction of complexity into the easy slogan. One also knows, from the other side, the faults that critics of anti-humanism have laid at the feet of the French writers: Foucault strangles agency; Derrida neutralizes politics; Lacan forecloses affect.

My thoughts are somewhat different. I would align myself with the French writers in their preference for all that decenters, not because their form of anti-humanism has an inherent value in the history of post-enlightenment thinking, but because they - along with Freud - have offered a crucial lesson about change that is at once very simple and very difficult. That lesson: the stronger

one's investment in knowing just where one is, the more difficult it is to go somewhere else. There is always the problem that in waiting to be addressed, in insisting on being addressed, one risks being left cold.

So I would regret the re-centering of the subject, but I would look to those very same French writers for a glimpse of why today's cultural criticism can both claim language as its foundation and, at the same time, afford us so much comfort for being where we are. It is to the linguistic turn that I want to look, and not because it was theoretically wanting but because it was, in fact, so dazzlingly productive. I am not pretending to make large claims about the limits of language and theory: it is no news that the very turn that exposes a blindness leaves a blind-spot in its wake. I am interested simply in looking more closely at the writings of several of the poststructuralist writers to see in some detail what in their brilliant opening up of texts they might have closed off.

By way of example, I will sketch out briefly my interests in the case of Lacan and Freud. There is, of course, an enormous amount of work on the relationships between the two, work of two very different critical registers: those writings that debate the value of Lacan's metapsychological work for the clinical practice of analysis and those that debate the value of Lacan's theoretical work for the practice of textual and cultural criticism. My intervention here is obviously situated in the latter category - which means for one thing that it is at a distinct historical distance from the heat of those early debates on Lacan, Freud, and criticism. I am not suggesting that such debates are dead; to the contrary, Lacanianism, both clinical and textual, is thriving in some areas. But we do have the advantage of being at an historical distance from the first rush of Lacanian ideas and I might use that distance to offer if not a different perspective on the question, then at least a symptom. The symptom I would offer from the distance of a few decades would be the language of cultural studies, which, as I have suggested, is a safe, wooden language that talks ceaselessly about language's restless mobility.

Like all good symptoms - the hysteric's paralyzed limb or the neurotic's obsessive idea - this one cannot in itself lead us any place in particular. There is no direct way the symptom can tell us where it came from. It is for that reason that psychoanalysis doesn't aim to cure the symptom; another one will just appear in its place, which is why Freud was concerned, in the passage I read at the beginning, with foreshortening that process. For Freud as for Lacan, the neurotic symp-

tom is a formation of the unconscious and always represents a compromise between two conflicting desires. The task for psychoanalysis is thus not to cure the symptom but to understand how the unconscious formation works.

If I were to continue this analogy with psychoanalytic practice, this analogy of the symptom of cultural studies, I could only do so, of course, at the level of structural similarities. I might talk of symptoms and perhaps even the unconscious formations that produce them, but anything I would say would simply point to structural homologies between the practice of textual criticism and the practice of psychoanalysis. The critic cannot do what the analyst does because, simply, there is no generalizable unconscious. Though symptoms might look alike, the unconscious operations that produce them are always unique to the individual patient or analysand and that uniqueness offers the critic no analogy.

This is not to say that to call the language of cultural studies a symptom is to speak falsely. To do so is to speak figuratively, which is what literary critics do, sometimes with enlightening results. And one of the reasons so many textual critics turned to Lacan was precisely because his psychoanalytic theorizations of language enlivened the language of textual criticism, enabling critics to read in ways they had not read. That I can, as many others have done, play with the analogies of text and psyche, is thanks to Lacan. Certainly Freudian psychoanalysis had a large influence on literary and artistic criticism and much of that criticism proceeded from analogy, but it wasn't until Lacan that language itself drove the analogy.

It is well known that Lacan made language foundational to psychoanalysis as early as his presentation to the Rome Congress in 1953. By 1964, in a seminar entitled "The Freudian Unconscious and Ours," he can say: "Most of you will have some idea of what I mean when I say - *the unconscious is structured like a language*. This statement refers to a field that is much more accessible to us today than at the time of Freud" (*The Four* 20). The field he refers to, of course, is the field of structural linguistics that so excited the French writers of the 50s and 60s. It was in this context that Lacan made Freud intelligible to a generation of French intellectuals. By 1957, Lacan knew the work of Claude Levi-Strauss and of Roman Jakobson as well as that of Saussure and was at work recasting Freudian psychoanalysis in the terms of structural linguistics. In "Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious," Lacan writes of a linguistic and structuralist Freud *avant la lettre*. Taking *The Interpretation of Dreams* - the beginning, Lacan says, of the royal

road to the unconscious - he asks what is *The Interpretation of Dreams* but a demonstration of the effect of the signifier on the signified? What is dream-work but the work of, as Freud said, Entstellung or distortion?

In *Interpretation of Dreams*, dream-work for Freud is, indeed, the work of distortion that transforms raw material, such as the day's residues, into a dream formation that has its own logic. Although one might identify the sources of the raw material of the dream, its meaning is not directly represented or thematized; nor does the content of the dream reveal very much, however banal or bizarre it may be. It is, rather, the task of interpretation to find the meanings of the dream-work by discovering the relationships of the dream elements to one another in the scene and in the recounting of the dream.

It is this thinking of Freud, this notion of dream-work, that Lacan recasts as the work of the signifier on the signified. Although Freud neither read Saussure nor used the term "signifier," Lacan sees Freud's work as having actually paved the way for later linguistic developments by "the sheer weight of its truth" ("Agency," *Ecrits* 162). Freud's insight that the meaning of the dream comes only from the dream-work's own logic demonstrates for Lacan the truth of the structuralist notion of the system as generative of meaning. Structuralism, in the most general terms, finds that it is in the closed system that meaning, a differential operation, is produced. And the task of the linguist, anthropologist, sociologist, analyst, or literary critic is to determine the structure of that differential system, thereby producing, as Joel Dor puts it, a "new intelligibility."

Indeed, the new intelligibility produced by Lacan not only made Freud's work interesting to the French writers of the period; it did so by wrenching Freud's writings from the domination of ego psychology. Much of Lacan's polemical fervor has to do with his disagreements with the International Psychoanalytic Association, from which he was expelled in 1953. A turn to the language of structuralist linguistics enabled Lacan to forge a more rigorous psychoanalysis and one in which the unconscious, all but domesticated by the ego psychologists, could be reanimated. His unconscious structured like a language aimed to underline that the Freudian unconscious is not in any sense the other or the negative of consciousness but operates according to a logic of its own. In a 1960 paper on "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," he writes:

“In the Freudian field, in spite of the words themselves, consciousness is a feature as inadequate to ground the unconscious in its negation (that unconscious dates from St Thomas Aquinas) as the affect is unsuited to play the role of the protopathic subject [that is, I take it, the sensory subject], since it is a service that has no holder. Since Freud the unconscious has been a chain of signifiers that somewhere (on another stage, in another scene, he wrote) is repeated, and insists on interfering in the breaks offered it by the effective discourse and the cognition that it informs” (*Ecrits*, 297).

As you know, the “chain of signifiers” Lacan borrows from Saussure, except that for Saussure the chain of relationality was between signs not signifiers. For Saussure a sign brings together the signifier and the signified. The signifier is not simply or merely a word; it is “the psychological imprint the sound image makes on our senses”; it is what Saussure calls “material,” not that it has to do with “material sound, a purely physical thing” but to distinguish it from the signified, which is a more abstract concept (66-67).

Along with the “chain of signifiers” Lacan borrows - loosely and without apology (“I am an analyst not a linguist”) - other elements of Saussure’s formulation, such as the importance of the synchronic understanding of language and the arbitrary nature of the sign. From Jakobson he takes the idea of language as operating on two axes, the paradigmatic axis of selection and substitution (as in one word rather than another) and the syntagmatic axis of combination (how words are put together), axes Jakobson associates in his study on aphasia with the metaphoric and the metonymic functions. And what was exciting for Lacan here was, to be sure, the echoes he found between the axes of language and Freud’s distinction between the roles of condensation and displacement in dream-work and in the unconscious in general. Another indication for Lacan of the truth of Freud’s theories.

There is much more to Lacan’s embrace of structural linguistics and, indeed, much has been written on the topic. And much has been written about the complex set of theories Lacan developed in his rethinking of Freud and the ways that rethinking brought a re-invigorated psychoanalysis to the center of the productive explosion of French writing in the 60s and 70s. My aim here, after all that has been written, is to suggest what it is we lose of Freud in reading Lacan, or,

more narrowly, since that too is huge topic of debate, what the connection might be between Lacan's reading of Freud and my reading of a cultural studies that leaves me cold.

In a longer paper I would look closely at Freud's and Lacan's theorizations of love - that emotion where address has so much at stake. Here, I can only offer some very brief thoughts, first, about Freud's and Lacan's theorizations of the unconscious and second, about the way they themselves figure those theorizations.

1. I'll take as an example of Freud's approach to the unconscious his idea of condensation. Rather than following the trajectories of Freud's texts, I will take a shortcut and cite from Laplanche and Pontalis:

“One of the essential modes of the functioning of the unconscious processes: a sole idea represents several associative chains at whose point of intersection it is located. From the economic point of view, what happens is that this idea is cathected by the sum of those energies which are concentrated on it by virtue of the fact that they are attached to difference chains.

Condensation can be seen to be at work in the symptom and, generally speaking, in the various formations of the unconscious. But it is in dreams that its action has been more clearly brought out.

It is shown up here by the fact that the manifest content is laconic in comparison with the latent content of the dream: it constitutes an abridged translation of dream. Condensation should not, however, be looked upon as a summary: although each manifest element is determined by several latent meanings, each of these, inversely, may be identified in several elements; what is more, manifest elements do not stand in the same relationship to each of the meanings from which they derive, and so they do not subsume them after the fashion of a concept” (82).

Glossing this definition, one comes first upon the word “idea,” an instance of the “unconscious ideas” that play such a role in Freud's thinking. The German word is *Vorstellung*: idea, notion, conception, mental image, but also presentation or

representation. Freud works very deliberately with this term. As Laplanche and Pontalis say: "Freud excuses himself for speaking of 'unconscious ideas': he was of course fully aware of the paradoxical effect of juxtaposing the two words. The fact that he persisted nevertheless in doing so is a sure sign that in his use of 'Vorstellung' one aspect of its meaning predominant in classical philosophy has faded into the background - namely, the connotation of the act of subjective presentation of the object to consciousness. For Freud, an idea or presentation is to be understood rather as what comes from the object and is registered in the 'mnemic systems'" (200).

What 'comes from the object' in this sense is what comes in the form of sensory reception without the subjective presentation of that sensory object to consciousness. What comes from the object is, rather, registered in the mnemic systems. To follow this thinking, it helps to remember that Freud was working with a neurological theory that he had developed in his *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, a theory he admitted was not based on empirical evidence but that had great hypothetical value for him and that has, in fact, proven to have interesting similarities with modern cybernetic theory. In this theory there are two types of neural pathways, one that receives fresh excitations undisturbed and another that takes on memory traces, the memory trace being "simply a particular arrangement of facilitations [or reduction of resistances], so organized that one route is followed in preference to another." (Laplanche and Pontalis 248).

For Freud, the neurological stimulation that comes from the outside of the human organism, as in the case of an infant, almost immediately becomes psychic energy as it is routed through the mnemic apparatus. And when a strong charge of psychic energy attaches to a memory trace - which is what Freud calls cathexis - we have the formation of the unconscious idea. In the early development of the infant, psychic energy, which he also calls the quota of affect, and the cathexis of unconscious ideas have to do with relatively simple relations of pleasure and unpleasure. As the person develops, the processes become, of course, more complex with the individual working unconsciously to maintain an equilibrium of acceptable excitation, to ward off unpleasurable affects. It is in these processes that Freud sees something like condensation, where a sole idea can represent several associative chains of weaker ideas because (following Laplanche and Pontalis): "this idea is cathected by the sum of those energies which are concentrated on it by virtue of the fact that they are attached to different chains" (82). It

is because of the dynamic relationship between psychic energy and unconscious ideas - a relationship involving complex formations of repression and defense - that there is no evident correlation, as Laplanche and Pontalis say, between latent and the manifest elements. Those relationships are, indeed, overdetermined.

With this glimpse at Freud's notion of the unconscious we can now consider Lacan's introduction of the signifier in his formulation of the unconscious structured like a language. When Lacan adopts Saussure's notion of the signifier, not only does he jettison the sign, but also the signified. It is the signifier that is primary for him. Moreover, whereas for Saussure, signifier and signified were like two sides of a piece of paper, indivisible, Lacan conceives of the relation between the two as barred, as constitutively obstructed; the signifier is produced by the signified but can only be read with difficulty as an effect.

Now, this begins to make sense if we think of Lacan's signifier as equivalent to Freud's unconscious idea. If we remember that Freud's cathected memory traces are not receptacles of content but ideas associated with other ideas, we can begin to understand the ground of Lacan's elaborate edifice of psychoanalytic signification. At the same time, we can also see problems, the most fundamental of which is that in the Lacanian signifier's extravagant, often surprising circulation, it can become enamored of itself, to the detriment of the unconscious in question. In one of his critiques of Lacan's ideas of language (*New Foundations*), Laplanche argues that for Freud as for him, language is always in a secondary situation with regard to the unconscious (this would be roughly equivalent to Lacan's notion of the symbolic). "Language, Laplanche writes, is governed by a mode of association and circulation that involves barriers and dams. If thought is to exist, there must be barriers to put an end to an otherwise endless process of circulation. And that is the characteristic of verbal language" (43). Theoretically, then, for Laplanche, the signifier cannot be the equivalent to the *Vorstellung*, to the unconscious idea. Moreover, the problems are not just theoretical. Commenting on Lacan's preference for outrageous puns and language play, Laplanche finds clinical effects: "Because it is centered upon verbal language, this form of Lacanian theory obviously makes it possible for the analyst to listen in a way that has nothing to do with listening to an individual analysand; it privileges the universal, or transuniversal if we wish to put it that way, effects of language" (43).

One quick if notorious illustration of the point Laplanche makes: Lacan's signifier of signifiers, the phallus. Lacan uses the term "phallus" so as to

distinguish it from the penis and to indicate that we are in the register of unconscious phantasy. When Freud theorizes castration, he also makes it clear he is talking about unconscious phantasies but ones that can never not have to do with the corporeal. Unconscious ideas, as he sees it, have everything to do with the corporeal experience of excitation, of pleasures and unpleasures, an experience that is shaped in the unconscious libidinal organization of the body. As the child enters language, it is not by formal analogy alone that feces and babies or feces and penises are associated and, when it comes to the child's assumption of sexual difference, with all that puzzle presents, it is no wonder castration looms large for the child, male or female, who knows a detachable body part when he or she sees it. And if the boy has a different relationship to that knowledge than the girl, it is because her unconscious fantasies, however unique to her, cannot be separated from her unconscious engagement with corporeal sensation. As to Lacan, those who know his elaboration of the phallus know that it is figured as the signifier of desire in the staging of the oedipal complex and that it positions the mother, father, child in terms of having and not having, being and not being it - the phallus. An ingenious theorization, no one can deny, but in Lacan's elaboration closed onto itself and cut off, as it were, from corporeal signification.

2. If a certain closed abstraction is the price we pay for moving from Freud to Lacan, my second point, having to do with how the two figure their theories, takes us very quickly to why I think cultural studies leave me cold.

The simplest way to characterize the difference between Freud and Lacan is that while Lacan operates in an indicative mode, Freud prefers the subjunctive. This may seem counter-intuitive. Lacan is the one whose language defies all mastery, mimicking the unconscious in its uncanny twists and turns. How can we claim it denotes something when we are never sure we have grasped its full meaning? And what about Freud's straightforward, pleasant prose and his expressed desire for scientific rigor? Clearly, the answers lie not in a simple contrast of their two styles but in the different epistemological frameworks in which they work and which shape their notions of what they do.

Freud sees his project as empirical, everything stemming from his clinical experience with patients. He often complains, as he does in *The Ego and the Id*, that critics demand coherence where premature coherence would be scientifically inappropriate: "...there has been a general refusal to recognize that psycho-

analytic research could not, like a philosophical system, produce a ready-made theoretical structure, but had to find its way step by step along the path towards understanding the intricacies of the mind by making an analytic dissection of both normal and abnormal phenomena” (32).

Lacan, on the other hand, has the enthusiasm for system of which I spoke earlier. As all the great structuralist writers know, the structure provides what Joel Dor calls the intelligibility of the system. Now, intelligibility does not necessarily bring with it the indicative mode. Indeed, the subjunctive mode (if this were the case, this would happen) is precisely the mode of the structural - ideally, that is. The problem is, the subjunctive mode has to be maintained by careful attention to one’s metacritical stance, something that Freud attends to throughout his work and that Lacan deliberately neglects. When Lacan proclaims that the unconscious is structured like a language, that claim could be taken either as a theoretical model of intelligibility or as a true description. But consider this statement:

“It is to prevent the field of which they [other psychoanalysts] are the inheritors from becoming barren, and for that reason to make it understood that if the symptom is a metaphor, it is not a metaphor to say so, any more than to say that man’s desire is a metonymy, however people may find the idea.” (“Agency” 175).

It is not a metaphor to say so. For Lacan this speaks the truth of language; which is to say, through it, language speaks its truth. For all of the play within in his theories, Lacan, when evoking the workings of the unconscious, asserts a certain descriptive truth of those formulations. Freud’s rhetorical manner is both more scientific and less ambitious. Because, as Freud claims over and over, science lags behind his research into the psyche, he has no idea what the physiological explanations are for the phenomena he witnesses, though he has no doubt but that they will become clear with time. Given that, he must content himself with interpretation and while he is determined that his interpretation be as comprehensive and as rigorous as possible, he knows the difference between a reading and a description. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, for example, is, from start to finish, a reading. His analysis of condensation is not a description of how the unconscious functions; it is a description of the effects of dream-work, of the effects he reads in his own dreams and dreams told to him. Even in his chapter on “The Psychology of Dream

Processes,” where he theorizes the relationships among unconscious, preconscious, and conscious formations, he reminds us, as he does so often in the course of his work, that the unconscious is a fiction, a conceptual convenience.

So, as it turns out, it is this metacritical subjunctive stance that I miss in Lacan and that seems to have gone missing as well in much of today’s cultural criticism. One can say that Freud was historically lucky in that he knew he didn’t know, whereas Lacan had the misfortune to know - including knowing that as a subject decentered in language he couldn’t possibly know. Still, to attribute Freud’s contribution to historical fortune alone would be to miss the brilliance of that contribution. In his treatment of patients and in his theorization of the psychic apparatus and the workings of the unconscious, Freud showed that the rational, conscious individual can no more resist his psychic drive to repeat than he can escape his phantasies of origin. That insight was not lost when it came to his own thinking.

From my vantage point, I can only say that I hope for a little less certainty from the postmodern subjects of language. To cite Derrida, speaking in 1966: “...I am trying, precisely, to put myself at a point so that I do not know any longer where I am going” (discussion following “Structure” 267).

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