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AESTHETICS OF HORROR: FREUDIAN THEORY OF ART AND DEATH DRIVE

Kees Vuijk, Kampen

Psychoanalysis is one of the great legacies of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the fact that many of its positions are highly debated and many of its hypotheses insufficiently verified, it is beyond question that psychoanalysis has thoroughly changed our view on mankind and its labours. In art theory, psychoanalysis has the merit that it has attracted attention to the question of the meaning of art. It shares this merit with Marxism and Nietzschean cultural analysis. Before the masters of distrust entered the stage art theory contented itself to historical description of works of art on the one hand and to philosophical reflection on beauty on the other hand. The work of art itself was treated as a given. One did not ask where it came from and why it was there in the first place. Freud was among the first theorists who saw artworks - and let us see them - in function of the life of the individual. A work of art meant something, he taught, in the first place for the person who made it, and through him, for man in general.

In his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* Freud summarises his view on the function of art in a clear and succinct way. At the end of the lecture on symptom building, in which he had explained how neurotics use fantasy to gra-

tify otherwise forbidden needs, he compares these doings of neurotics with the work of artists. Artists also seek to fulfil via their art needs they cannot satisfy in a direct way. The difference between artists and neurotics however is the way they handle fantasy. Artists have the capacity – or the talent – to mould their fantasies in such a way that they are effective not only for themselves, but also for other people. So works of art can serve persons other than the artist himself to find satisfaction for their repressed needs. Because of this talent artists earn recognition from their fellow people. Finding their works useful to balance their own psychic turmoil, to get consolation and relieve for their pains, people have good reason to admire artists and honour them. As a consequence of that artists – at least some of them - become outstanding people in society, a status which gives them access to pleasures which before were far out of their reach. In this way the artist finds in the end not only in his fantasy satisfaction for socially impossible and morally forbidden needs, sometimes he even finds real satisfaction for these needs through the workings of his fantasies. As Freud writes: “[He] has now attained *through* his fantasy, what before he only had attained *in* his fantasy: honour, power and the love of women.”¹

This short summary of his art theory by Freud highlights already those characteristics that have provoked the greatest objections to his theory, namely that it ignores the qualities of the artwork itself and that it has a strong reductionist tendency: it considers art only in so far as it means something for the individual, coping with the often contradictory demands of his cultural environment on the one hand and his libidinal needs on the other. Moreover among these libidinal needs Freud favours strongly the sexual urges. So Freud reduces the great achievements of artists once and again to their sexual experiences, and within these mainly to those gained in childhood.²

The first of these objections can quite easily be met. Although it is right that psychoanalytic art theory gives no attention to the formal qualities of works of art, this does not mean that its emphasis on the function art plays in the life of artist and the art consumer is wrong. It is the explicit intention of psychoanalytic

¹ Freud, *Studienausgabe*, Bnd I, Fischer, Frankfurt aM, 1969, p. 366.

² My discussion of these objections makes gratefully use of an essay by Jos de Mul “Dichter op de divan. De psychoanalytische esthetica van Freud” in H.A.F. Oosterling en A.W. Prins (ed.) *Filosofie en Kunst 2. Esthetica in de 20e eeuw: een andere verstandhouding*, Rotterdam 1994.

art theory to ask attention for the biographical meaning of art. That it is right in doing so is proven by the productive way in which artist themselves (especially in the narrative arts: fiction, film, theatre) have made use of Freudian concepts and thoughts. As I stated already: the staging of the question of the meaning of art is precisely one of the merits of psychoanalytic art theory.

The second objection is more powerful. It is indisputably true that Freud's explanations of works of art are very one-sided. In his case studies of artists and art works, e.g. his study on Leonardo da Vinci (*A childhood remembrance*) and his analysis of some stories by E.Th. Hofmann (*The uncanny*), the origin of art is inevitably found in childhood experiences of sexuality. It is with good reason that the image of psychoanalytic art theory as a search for the hidden sexual core in every work of art has been widely popularised. Art is sublimated sexuality, this image teaches, it is a culturally accepted form for otherwise socially unacceptable sexual wishes. This popularisation of Freudian art theory has been a strong force in the cultural revolution that has upset western societies in the sixties and seventies of the twentieth century. On the basis of this image Marcuse for instance could give art a leading role in demonstrating the repressive character of western culture and in aspiring for a desublimated culture, i.e. a culture in which repression of sexual wishes is no longer necessary.³ Marcuse also does not hesitate to draw the consequences of this application of Freudian thoughts, namely that in a sexually liberated society art no longer would have a special place. "At that moment art maybe has lost its privileged and from reality isolated domination over imagination, beauty and dream".⁴

However, convincing as the objection of reductionism is when we look at the application of psychoanalytic art theory both by Freud himself and by his followers, it is questionable whether it is valid for this theory as a whole. When Freud demonstrated repressed sexual experiences at work in works of art, he didn't do that to support his theory about the meaning of art, but to support his theory of childhood sexuality. The fact that he once and again reveals sexual urges to be active in artistic achievements, doesn't mean necessarily that he believes that every work of art is a late and distorted offspring of childish sex, it shows primarily how much he wants to give as much evidence as he can for his theory that childhood

³ See H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, Boston 1955

⁴ H. Marcuse, *Vertoog over de bevrijding*, Utrecht, 1970, p. 74 (*An essay on liberation*, 1969)

sexuality plays an important role in human behaviour in general. So to dismiss Freud's art theory on the basis of the examples he himself gives of it, is, I believe, to act too hastily. Before we do that, I suggest that we try to give this theory a wider scope, and make a serious look for different and more varied applications of it. One way to do this that presses itself is to look at the relationship of this theory to the other basic drive Freud proposes in his later work: death drive. The question rises whether art is an outlet for death drive in the same way as it is for libidinal drive?

This question is not as simple as it looks, because to answer it, one must first know what death drive is and how it manifests itself. At this point however, Freud is far from clear. And neither are his followers.

In any way we must decline the most popular of the images of death drive, that is: death drive as an inborn inclination to destroy, the deepest motive of all aggressive behaviour. As Karen Horney has shown there is no need to introduce a special drive in psychoanalysis for this aggressive tendency. Aggressive and destructive behaviour can very well be explained on the basis of libido alone. One doesn't need a special instinct for that.⁵ The same thing holds for art theory. Certainly there are artworks – especially in modern art - which can be regarded as sublimations of aggressive tendencies, but in all these cases behind these tendencies a stronger motive can be suspected. Artists that use forms of aggression in their works can easily be unmasked as doing this because in the end they want to achieve “power, honour and the love of women”. It is libido that governs them, even when they use aggression as a means to reach their libidinal end.

So, death drive must be distinguished from an aggressive instinct. If it were just that, it would be at best a secondary phenomenon. The equation of death drive and aggression is however more a finding of American Freudianism, than that it is a true teaching of Freud. Freud never was very outspoken about death drive. In his later life, he became more and more convinced that death drive was a necessary component of human behaviour. But he kept wrestling with the concept.

Death drive first appears as a concept in the book *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (*Beyond the Pleasure principle*).⁶ Its appearance is the conclusion of

⁵ Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, New York 1939, p. 120ff.

⁶ S. Freud, *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*, in Studienausgabe, Bnd. III Psychologie des Unbewussten, Frankfurt aM 1975.

an inquiry into the phenomenon of repetition compulsion, that can be observed in young children and neurotics that suffer from trauma (and maybe we could add: in artists). Notable is especially that this compulsion manifests itself also with recognisably painful thought and acts. Many times in the repetition no pleasure is involved. Freud wonders what could be the drive behind this behaviour. More particular he wonders what this drive aims at, because until then drive in his view had always been driven by pleasure. He proposes the following hypothesis: "drive is an urge to repair a former situation, that had to be given up because of the interference of external influences"⁷. The basic tendency of all drive is a conservative one. This idea pleases him. It accords with his (older) idea that pleasure originates from the release of tensions that are the result of disturbances interfering an original balance. Life doesn't like changes. On the contrary it is constantly striving to keep things the same or if that is impossible to return to the situation before the changes appeared. At that point Freud makes a bold step and declares: "the end (here as: aim, target) of all life is death"⁸. If life wants to return to former situations, then in the end it should want to return to the situation before life, the inorganic state of pure balance. Basically life doesn't like to live. Life is a detour to death. It is thus not aggressive behaviour that puts Freud on the track of death drive, but the suspicion of an inclination in humans to refuse life, an unwillingness or maybe an incapacity to live.

After his daring proposal Freud's primary concern is to bring it in accordance with his earlier ideas about drive. Until then Freud had divided human drives in two main groups: Ego drives (whose business is selfmaintenance) and libidinal drives (which are active in maintaining the species). Now he asks himself how death drive fits into this classification. It is quite easy, he finds, with the necessary adaptations, to bring death drive in accordance with the drive to selfmaintenance. It is harder to see how the sexual drives go together with the idea of death drive. Indeed there is striking urge to repeat in sexual behaviour. Is not the ultimate aim of this behaviour to repeat the individual in the species? In a way sex is also a conservative behaviour. However, it is difficult to see how the ultimate aim of sexuality could be death. Therefore he concludes to a new dualism of drives: death drive and drive to live. After that, Freud is not completely satisfied. Two

⁷ Freud, *Jenseits*, p. 250.

⁸ Freud, *Jenseits*, p. 248.

questions still bother him. First: how do death drive and life drive relate to each other? And secondly: How does death drive appear and does it actually appear in a pure form in human life?

In the discussion of those questions, which is long, complicated and not very clear, Freud considers the idea that both drives ultimately go back to one, that libidinal drive is the main drive, and death drive just an derived form of it. In any case that would explain why death drive seems to appear only in combination with libido, in particular forms of sexual behaviour like sadomasochism and melancholy, and never as a independent phenomenon. Two arguments however hold him back from that conclusion. At first he thinks that taking that step would further those critics of psychoanalysis who state that in psychoanalysis everything turns around sex. And in the second place it would bring him back in the neighbourhood of his former pupil Carl Jung, who also assumed only one drive, called libido – although the Jungian libido is more than sex - with whom Freud just recently had broken because of this monism.

It is typical for Freud that he fails to consider another possibility namely that death drive is the most basic drive, and libido just derivative. Is it indeed his preoccupation with sex that partially blinds him here? However it may be, all his problems seem to be solved when one holds this position. Sex is no longer the centre of psychoanalysis. There is a big difference with the teachings of Jung. And it is understandable why it is so difficult to spot death drive on its own, in the wild so to say, as an independent feature. Precisely as basic, death drive is something that is mixed up in everything, that is never pure and independent, because, like God in pantheism, it is everywhere and present in all there is.

In modern psychoanalytic thinking this last conclusion is drawn by Slavoj Žižek, the Slovenian apologist of Lacan. “Drive as such is death drive”, he states, “it (=drive) stands for an unconditional impetus which disregards the proper needs of the living body and simply battens on it.”⁹ In Žižek’s perspective death drive is something that opposes the body, that blocks its instinctual need to lead a normal physical life, in that way can be called “meta-physical”, not in the traditional meaning of belonging to a transcendental, spiritual world, but in a more profane explanation as “involving another materiality, beyond (or rather beneath)

⁹ S. Žižek, *The Plague of Fantasies*, London / New York 1997, p. 31.

spatio-temporal reality”, also called a “sublime materiality”. Of this materiality, Zizek suspects, modern art (Zizek names Schoenberg, Kandinsky, Munch, Van Gogh) shows us a spectral glimpse.¹⁰

Let us see if we can bring all these elements into a coherent story. Freud discovers in neurotics and children an obsession to repeat that he finds hard to explain because the repeated events and actions many times do not give pleasure but pain. It leads him to the hypothesis that there is in human life a drive that resists change whatsoever, that yearns for an eternal repetition of the same. The strength of this drive is shown by the fact that in the end it even conquers life itself. From the perspective of this drive, life is just a deviation, a detour towards its end, because as we all know “the end of all life is death”. Freud calls this drive death drive.

After this introduction of death drive Freud has great trouble to give it a place in his system. Especially its relation to the other fundamental drive Freud recognises, sex drive or libido, bothers him. Death drive never seems to reveal itself in pure form. Mostly it is mixed up in one way or another with sex drive. On the other hand death drive cannot be reduced to libido. Freud concludes to a dualism of drives, death drive and life drive, a drive to grow and a drive to perish, Eros and Thanatos.

As noted already, Freud overlooked the possibility that libido would be a derivative of death drive, a conclusion drawn by the unorthodox psychoanalytic thinker Zizek. In my opinion what prevents Freud to take this way is not so much his obsession with sex as well as his biological bias. Freud's primary outlook on life, human life not excluded, is Darwinian. Life is a system that strives for ever growing complexity. This biological movement is what libido represents. Libido is the form this movement takes in human life. It is the need to make bonds, to share your life with other people or to make other people share their lives with you, to build social systems, to procreate and educate new individuals within these systems, to assure a future that will be better than the past. Death drive, however, is essentially anti-biological. It stands for something that resists to be part of the progressive cycle of life, that can never be integrated in the great chain of being.

If one disregards Freud's biological bias than the suggestion that this death drive could be the primary force in human life opens interesting new views

¹⁰ Zizek, l.c. p. 32.

on human existence. Death drive could than be seen as the thing that is responsible for the gap between human existence and nature. It is because of death drive that humans are not fully part of nature in the way animals are. Death drive releases the bonds that held protohumans caught in the system of nature. Since this release humans are radically unbounded. As an effect of this dissoluteness human behaviour no longer just responds to biological laws. So it is death drive that turns supposedly neutral biological acts like feeding, defecating, courting and mating into complicated actions, that almost never run smoothly and can become sources of lots of trouble. The varieties of libido (oral, anal, genital, sexual) that Freud has discovered and researched so thoroughly, are, seen this way, just the effects of death drives distortions of the law of nature, that humans must find ways to live with. Sex drive itself is not a primordial feature, it is secondary to death drive. Sex drive should be seen as sexual instinct unleashed by death drive. Therefor it is no longer instinct but drive. If Zizek says that all drive is death drive, this could also be understood in this way that everything in nature that is touched by the thing that death drive stands for, breaks adrift and turns into drive. From a fairly predictive, regularly working, biological mechanism it becomes an unpredictable, essentially boundless, possibly destructive force that needs to be checked and bound - in other words that is in need of culture.

Indeed, from a psychoanalytical point of view culture is necessary to provide humans with opportunities to gratify their needs in safe and acceptable ways. That is the lesson Freud ultimately draws from the myth of the primal horde, a story he makes up about the life of archaic mankind. In prehistoric times, Freud suggests, mankind lived in small nomadic groups, dominated by a old male individual, the patriarch, whose reign includes keeping all the women of the horde for himself. In Freuds story the young males of the horde cannot endure this situation any longer, they start to revolve against the domination of the father-leader, a revolution which culminates in the murder of the patriarch. After this horrible act the young men are frightened by what has happened and in order to prevent a repetition of it they insert rules to regulate their internal relationships, first of which is the incest taboo. On the foundation of these rules human civilization is construed.

There are several versions of this myth in Freuds writings. The one just told follows the earliest version (*Totem and Taboo*¹¹). In it emphasis is laid on the sexual frustration of the young males. Aggression here is a by-product, it appears

as a means to achieve sexual ends (see what is said about Karen Horney above). Civilisation appears as a compromise between total repression and total liberty. Complete freedom ends in chaos and murder. Man is in need of social rules to guarantee a peaceful existence.

In the second version (in *Civilisation and its Discontents*¹²) Freud dwells on the feelings that come up after the patricide. Why do the young men regret their deed after the act? If sex is the only thing that counts, should not their act be considered very successful? Freud then explains these negative feelings by suggesting that they must have been there from the beginning. They have their roots in death drive that is also the main motive behind the revolution. After the act this death drive has to be repressed. By this repression the aggressive feelings turn inwards and reappear in consciousness in the form a feelings of regret and guilt. At the end of his life these feelings offer for Freud the best evidence for the existence of death drive. They show us death drive as a really independent feature. These feelings form the core of superego, human conscience. Around this conscience culture grows.

In line of the thoughts developed above one could ask another question to Freud about his story. Why the young males are not content with their role in the horde in the first place? We know now that the situation Freud sketches of the primal horde is very similar to the circumstances many primates live in. In primate hordes their is a periodical contest between the males over the dominating position. However, these leaderships struggles never get out of hand. When the leader is beaten by a stronger young male, he simply abdicates. After that the group hierarchy is reformed. In Freuds story the same situation leads to murder, terror, taboos and regrets. What is the difference? Could it not be that in humans the sexual instincts are not that well defined as they are in primates? That it is this indecisiveness – to use a word that today is popular among Derrideans - that turns this contest into a revolution and let this revolution get completely out of hand? So that only by artificial means the peace can be restored? In this perspective culture is an artefact that man needs because of the unclarity of his instincts, that reveal themselves therefore in the form of an undirected and unbounded drive, a

¹¹ S. Freud, Totem und Tabu, in S. Freud *Studienausgabe, Bnd. IX. Fragen der Gesellschaft / Ursprünge der Religion*, Frankfurt aM, 1969, p. 410f, 427ff.

¹² S. Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, in *Studienausgabe, Bnd. IX. Fragen der Gesellschaft / Ursprünge der Religion*, Frankfurt aM, 1969, p. 257f.

drive that without artificial help would lead humans via the shortest detour to death.

An often heard objection to Freuds story about the beginnings of civilisation is that it is almost completely made up. It does not reckon with known ethological and palaeontological facts about the behaviour of the first humans. There is no proof for it whatsoever. It is a pure fantasy, be it a clever and a seductive one.

From the point of view of Zizek however this objection is not very powerful. Rather it is an affirmation of his thesis that – stated in my words – fantasy is the hidden core of every culture. When culture is the framework that gives humans the possibility to separate order from chaos, to build an idea about reality and - with the help of this idea - to distinguish reality from fantasy, then at the origin of this culture lies a fundamental fantasy, hidden from realistic thought, no subject of discussion, repressed from consciousness, only accessible through its symptom, that is culture. No culture without fantasy. That is why every culture according to Zizek is inevitably ideological.

We are back at the beginning of this essay, where Freud was quoted saying that art is a special form of fantasy. Zizeks interpretation of fantasy strongly supports Freuds view that fantasy in art is not just a particular imagination of an artist, but is a fantasy that appeals to man in general. Better than Freud however Zizek reveals the background of this appeal. It is because fantasy is a necessary component of human existence and that is because of the inherent boundlessness of it, that in psychoanalytical theory appears as death drive. With fantasy humans have to fill the gaps which death drive strikes in their existence and which make that without fantasy they would not be able to give direction to their lives. With drive alone man cannot live. Drive has to be domesticized through fantasy. In this process drive turns into desire.

Art is not the only human achievement based on fantasy. In Zizeks view every cultural achievement is founded on a fundamental fantasy. Religious belief, political ideology, sophisticated ethics as well as everyday morale, including the generally accepted ideas about and practices of sex, all these are sustained by fantasy. Reality, as we experience it, would not exist without fantasy. Most of the time this fantasy is deeply hidden. In art however it sometimes comes to the surface. Therefor Zizek states that art is a way of “going through the fantasy”. In art some-

times we see fantasy as fantasy. When we conceive this movement as a dialectical double negation this means that in art sometimes death drive itself can be experienced.

The favourite example Zizek uses for the support of his idea about death drive is therefore an aesthetic one: it is the figure of the Wagnerian hero. Characteristic of this hero, exemplified by The Flying Dutchman, is that he is unable to live and unable to die at the same time. He is slain by a spell that we can identify as the spell of death drive, which makes that he cannot take part in human life. He lives a spectral existence in a zone between life and death. This makes him an uncanny figure. He represents the shadow side of human existence. He reminds humans that their lives are in no way self evident. In the shadows of reality always slumbers the other side, not just another reality but a non reality. Reality is not as real as it looks. Not only it contains the possibilities of other realities, more uncanny it contains also the possibility of not being real itself, the mode of reality that the scholastics in the Middle Ages called contingent. I believe that what the flying Dutchman brings into consciousness is not just that human beings face the possibility of not being at the end of life, when their life finishes, but that for humans this not being is an inherent possibility of all there is, precisely as something that is. What is, could very well not have been. (That is in my opinion the best description of the uncanny.)

A different example of the same condition offer the main characters of Kafkas famous stories (in particular *The Castle*). Rudiger Safranski has described how they all seem to “hesitate before birth”.¹³ They stand as it were on the threshold of human existence but cannot bring themselves to transgress it. They live and do not live at the same time. The birth they refuse is the birth of human existence that is to say an existence within culture, with all the restrictions and with all the opportunities this brings with it. That reminds of the way the flying Dutchman can be redeemed of his spell, that is by the act of a pure woman who wants to marry him. We can interpret this redemption as taking the step into culture by way of becoming part of the fantasy of another human being.

At the same time as the Wagnerian hero enters the stages of the Operahouses popular culture is also enriched by new figures who can be seen as the products of an

¹³ R. Safranski, *Wieviel Wahrheit braucht der Mensch?*, München, 1990, p. 157.

imagination in which death drive comes to the surface. With the heroes of high culture just mentioned these figures have in common that they live in a zone between life and death. I mean count Dracula and the Monster of Frankenstein. They are the forerunners of a whole new genre that in our time enjoys an ever growing popularity: horror.

Since Bram Stoker first published his novel about Dracula the figure of the vampire has exercised an ongoing attraction on the human imagination. I line with what is said before I suggest this is because it embodies the possibility that the dichotomy of death and life is not all there is. In between there is an other possibility, the possibility of being undead, no longer living but still not quite dead. A continuation of life not in the form of a spiritual existence, but in the form of living in another materiality, a materiality that is much more enduring than physical materiality, a materiality that in itself is unperishable and ensures its figures a meta-physical life (except for some unhappy encounters with an external force). The core of the Dracula story is that this metaphysical existence exercises a seductive force that is hard to resist. What seduces here can be called freedom, freedom from the constraints of normal physical existence, the freedom of pure materiality. From the point of view of normal existence however this freedom appears as a radical arbitrariness, that forms a danger to this existence and is therefor horrifying.

A less eccentric figure than the vampire that also embodies this horrifying arbitrariness is the psychopath, main character in many contemporary horror stories, but, more uncanny not only existing in fantasy but also in real life!

Frankenstein's Monster is still a fantasy figure, but one wonders how long that will be. When the story about Frankenstein is considered an early example of science fiction than we can say that this story and all the other stories about artificial, man-made creatures - robots, thinking computers, cyborgs – is a guideline for many technological inventions of recent times. Frankenstein's dream is more real now than it was in the days that Mary Shelley wrote it down. No matter these developments the core problem of this story still haunts us. The problem of life. When the story of Dracula posits the question if death is really death, than Frankenstein's creature turns the question around and asks weather life is really life. The Monster and its successors in contemporary imagination are products of basically mechanistic processes that are nonetheless remarkably equal to living human beings and at first sight cannot be distinguished from them. One could

even say that they are superior human beings, because they have superior strength or superior intelligence and are far less vulnerable than humans to the sufferings of daily life. Because of these qualities they can perform acts that humans cannot. And it is precisely this perfection that makes them nonhuman. Whatever they do, they are just what they are, always in complete accordance with themselves. It is this quality that makes them horrifying.

What binds together these figures of popular culture is that for us, mortal humans, they all represent pure evil. From its representatives it can be concluded that this evil can be characterised as a force that follows rules that from the point of view of ordinary reality cannot be understood. But not because they are completely irrational. On the contrary, I think we should say that the logic of this evil is too perfect to be understood by humans. Ordinary human reality is never completely rational. In human life rationality is always mixed with fantasy. It is characteristic of the figures of evil that they lack this fantasy. Therefore it is only by fantasy that we can beat them.¹⁴

Zizek also reflects upon the proximity of death drive and evil. In this context he sometimes refers to a concept in Kants philosophy that is called “diabolical evil”. This diabolical evil is a position beyond the world of phenomena. It has its roots in the noumenal world. Strangely enough it thus coincides with its opposite in Kant philosophy: the Good. Is not the fully good act for Kant precisely that act that completely ignores the rules and logic of the ordinary phenomenal world and is governed by reason alone?¹⁵

Death drive is a necessary condition of human existence, but it is not sufficient. Death drive loosens the bonds that tie humans to nature. Doing this it releases the instincts and makes them boundless. Because of these boundless instincts humans are liberated from the cycles of nature. This liberated position however is hard to endure. (In recent times the French novelist Michel Houellebecq has convincingly described the hardness of a liberated life). In order not to perish in freedom humans need to compensate for this freedom with fantasy. Art is one of the

¹⁴ As the character of the writer in Wes Cravens horrormovie *New Nightmares* remarks: evil can only successfully be fought by making a story of it.

¹⁵ See S. Zizek, *The Plague of Fantasies*, p. 225ff; Idem, “A hair of the dog that bit you”, in Wright and Wright (eds.) *The Zizek Reader*, Oxford 1999, p. 273f. Zizek observes how Kant himself is unable to deal with this coincidence of good and evil, but that Hegel does.

products of this fantasy, a special one however, because in art, in particular in modern art, this fantasy is shown as a fantasy. It is in the revelation of how fantasy works in human life that lies the worth of art. It is the value of psychoanalysis that it has made us attentive to that.