Pictures of Persons

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In this paper the question of what pictures can and cannot achieve is discussed from the point of view of its primary subject matter: persons in a moral space. Photographs of persons are standardly treated as correct portraits. But in what sense are they? We also view our mirror image as faithfully portraying our selves, but in what sense does it? A face is not just a mere object out there. In a face one sees a person—and the person looks back at one. The reciprocal exchanging of facial expressions is something pictures normally fail to render. To see how pictures fail to render what is central to moral space is to see what pictures, photographs included, can and cannot do.

1. Introduction

A full account of pictures should explain the following: i. the nature of the pictures themselves; ii. the epistemology involved in their depicting and the ontology of the depicted; and iii. the use people put pictures to in their separate practices. The present essay deals only with the first issue, pictures themselves, and more particularly with the powers of pictures to render moral spaces, i.e. spaces which include humans interacting.

Animals and babies might recognise the thing that a picture always is, and perhaps tear it apart or eat it, without recognising it as a picture. A picture must be recognised as one to be one. Being a picture is response-dependent. The response involves perceptual skills, or capacities based in what can be described as a representational attitude, so-called because it forms the primary approach towards representations generally.

Section 2 concerns the psychological capacities required for pictorial recognition. I discuss Sir Ernst Gombrich's proposal to understand pictorial seeing in terms of how a picture substitutes for the real thing, and Richard Wollheim's seeing-in account, and argue that Gombrich's substitution account can help us understand the peculiar ways in which pictures may or may not render the moral space of the depicted, but also that it overstates the proper response to pictures.

As an account of pictorial seeing Wollheim's seeing-in seems our best theory to date. It assumes a twofolded attention to both paint and depicted: we see the depicted in the paint. Because with photographs such twofolded attention is not as straightforwardly available as with painting authors have argued that we see the depicted transparently, through, not in the photo. I am not convinced about this transparency thesis, but, for the sake of my present argument decide to leave it. At least it seems okay to simply abstract from the issue of twofoldness. What I do want to keep from Wollheim's view is the thesis that recognising

pictures is a perceptual process. To make sense of a difference between perceiving a moral space whilst being in it and perceiving a depiction of one, I understand pictorial seeing as a particular kind of anticipating embodied agency that, in my view, characterises perception, generally, in its everyday guise. Unlike Wollheim I argue that pictorial perception is not atypical as a perceptual capacity. Looking at the depicted in a picture is just like looking at it in real life, but in a disembodied, non-egocentrical way. It is the phenomenology of the representational attitude that is atypical, as it removes the embodied agent from the world he perceives in the picture and removes the actual possibility of the anticipated behaviour. When I see a chair I see something I could sit on and I might actually decide to do it, believing, as I do, that the chair's affordance is real; when I see a depicted chair, however, though I might again entertain the exact same thoughts, I would entertain them without believing that I could really choose to sit on the chair.

From section 3 onwards, I shall be concentrating on pictures of persons, because they bring out in the best possible way the full potential of depiction, as well as its major challenges, in regard of their rendering the affordances of what they depict. One of the challenges concerns the manner in which the gaze of a depicted person can betray the picture-maker who by definition is excluded from the image, *in* the image--we see this in snap shots and certain art photographs, but not in journalistic photos, let alone iconic ones. The issue at stake is a picture's power to render a moral space where humans interact, the core of which consists in their exchanging of gazes. On one level, it is not saying much that viewers of pictures cannot respond to depicted people--just like one cannot sit on a depicted chair. On another level, it may teach us how pictures render moral spaces.

Pictures seem similar to mirror images, as has often been remarked. Photographs have often been characterised as frozen mirror images and Plato (1988, 596d-e, p. 39) notoriously characterised picture makers as people holding up a mirror to the world. Plato was being cynical: he thought that pictures give one the impression of delivering the thing depicted, whereas perhaps they don't. Of course, no picture can literally deliver the real thing, as it would not count as a picture but as the thing itself, or a copy thereof. But that is not the issue I am dealing with here. Portraits show best what is at stake.

The self-portraits that are most interesting in the present context are those where the depicted person is the one who drew or painted the image by using a mirror to study his own reflection. The viewer of the portrait sees (the maker's rendition of) what its maker saw of himself--perceptually, without the intervening of foreign devices like a camera, language, another person, or a fantasy. I'll discuss examples in sections 3 and 4.

2 Seeing-in as Anticipation

Recognising something as a picture, involves 1. a recognition of something with the peculiar phenomenological characteristic of addressing only a selection of the senses, specifically vision, in order to bring to the mind something which isn't present perceptually; and a proper response to it, a representational attitude, which neutralises the viewer's more normal moral agency though not her moral thought,[1] 2. a capacity to see a space or place in it where 3. one might be able to walk around in if only one were transported into it.[2]

Trompe l'œuil might seem our prime example of this. But trompe l'œuil does not meet the requirement that pictures be recognised as pictures (1). Trompe l'œuils are made to produce an illusion in their viewers of being able to interact in the space shown--they function effectively only when they do not show their nature as a flat marked surface, in which case the

act of perceiving them is not an instance of the perceptual power particular to pictures, seeing-in, but is a normal case of perception of a space--albeit one that is fooled by trompe l'œuil.

Sir Ernst Gombrich (1963) has compared depiction with substitution. Just like a hobby horse derives its meaning from the fact that children use it to play horse-back riding without a real horse, we use a picture to watch the depicted in its absence. This account assumes that seeing is comparable to doing. Riding a hobby-horse one feels an object between one's legs and acts as if it is the object itself which moves one forward. But we could pick any rock and do these things to it, without wanting to state that the rock depicts a horse. A picture may substitute for some aspect of the depicted but not for the use that one might make of it--unless that use would be mere observation, but of course this is not what Gombrich meant. Recognising the hobby-horse *as a representation* may involve anticipations on things we could possibly do comparable to those we might have upon seeing a real horse. Hence the real behaviour with the hobby horse is relevantly similar to real horse-back riding, but for the visibility of the horse. Substitution is not depiction.

Another flaw of this account is nicely illustrated in the Magritte painting, "La Condition Humaine", which depicts a room, with an easel holding a painting which depicts part of a landscape, which seems to be the landscape that the canvas hides from our view.[3] One is lured into thinking that indeed the depicted painting depicts what it hides, as there are clear clues in the overall painting suggesting this. But Magritte paints a large tree in the middle of the scene on the depicted canvas as if daring us to assume that it is there in the hidden landscape as well. There would be a way to find that out: if only we were in the depicted room, we could look behind the easel and see for ourselves. The room, however, is not available to us moral agents: it is depicted. Magritte shows us how a picture does not substitute for moral spaces. From this, it is clear that Gombrich's substitute account tells only part of the story and needs further sorting out.

Richard Wollheim has repeatedly argued that depiction is primarily a perceptual experience: there is a surface wherein one sees something which is distinct from the picture itself. Wollheim calls this seeing-in and he rightly thinks that it is a capacity people already have available to them. For instance, people can see all sorts of things in clouds (Wollheim 2001). Of course, no cloud depicts, say, a camel as that would assume an intention behind the cloud's form: something which would make seeing the camel in its surface "correct". Nor is seeing-in a capacity that is always automatically triggered. Sometimes one needs suitable prompting, as Wollheim illustrates nicely:

"Consider the following experiment: I look at a picture that includes a classical landscape with ruins. And now imagine the following dialogue: "Can you see the columns? " "Yes." "Can you see the columns as coming from a temple? " "Yes." "Can you see the columns that come from the temple as having been thrown down? " "Yes." "Can you see them as having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago? " "Yes." "Can you see them as having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago by barbarians? " "Yes." "Can you see them as having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago by barbarians wearing the skins of wild asses? " (Pause.) "No."

At each exchange, what "Yes" means is that the prompt has made a difference to what has been seen in the scene, just as the "No" signifies that, for at least this spectator here and now, the limits of visibility in this surface have been reached." (Wollheim 2001, 23-24).

Wollheim concludes that seeing-in is permeable to thought, "whether the thought is caused by

the marked surface or is prompted by another", and that this accounts for the wider scope of seeing-in compared to "that of seeing face-to-face" (idem 24). Wollheim thinks this does not make seeing-in an instance of imagining things, which would similarly be permeable to thought. He does think that imagination has an important role to play when engaging with certain pictures, namely those which make one imagine to engage in the depicted space as some internal figure in it, as a Spectator in the Picture. In my view, Wollheim's choice of examples suggests that we should, or at least could approach pictures in terms of their conveying moral spaces wherein we see or anticipate to see humans interact with the world.

Seeing-in is a recognition of space, and that involves, in my view, an anticipation of possible bodily movement: an affordance of something for creatures of a certain kind.[4] Perception, too, generally involves a complicated anticipation of bodily actions with objects out there.[5] In this, pictures are not unlike normal perceptions, but for the fact that in normal perception the anticipations can and often are realised: we sit ourselves on a chair, but only after we have recognised it as affording such behaviour.

Plato's myth of the cave describes the prisoners as people who could not possibly be thought of as perceiving thickly, as per my account: there is no way for them to learn from whatever input their senses offer them how to interact with objects in the world out there. There is no intelligible regularity to be found in the shadowy shapes on a crumpled cave wall in combination with the synchronous sounds from behind, let alone from any corroborative feed-back received from embodied responses to the world. Normally, when we sit in a chair we prove the chair's perceptually anticipated affordances to be true to the world. But Plato's prisoners, I would guess, would not even have a concept of "behind".

In contrast to a real perception, representations by definition subtract certain aspects of the represented--to see a picture of x is phenomenologically unlike seeing x. This phenomenological subtraction, though, plays an added role in explaining our confusion about photography. It is because here the subtraction follows a causal lineage that we seem to feel that it does not takes place: we feel as though a photograph is transparent to what it shows us, and as though our perception of one is factive with regard to what it shows.

Like perceptions, photos are proof of what they show and could be viewed as factive, as Rob Hopkins has called it: they are guaranteed to get the facts right. I submit that this claim about photography must be qualified, as there is a crucial difference between photos and perceptions. Perception's facticity is not a primitive, but is based in its polymodality, the synchronous delivery of data peculiar to each one of our five sense modalities. Photographs count as proof, not on the basis of such polymodality, but on the basis of a causal mechanism combined with a chemical procedure that is scientifically accountable. The mechanism has nothing to do with polymodal perception or with the resemblance (or transparency) of the resultant picture--much like a thermometer is proof of a certain temperature without resembling it.

Unlike perceptions, photographs don't tell one what it is that they are proof of, nor do they allow the viewer the means to find that out, because, as with Magritte's room, that would require the viewer to move about in the context of the depicted, its moral space. So even photos have an issue with the moral spaces they seem so flawlessly to depict.

Because photographs are the result of merely causal processes, we get to think that other types of things that are causally connected to certain events could be treated as pictures too.[6] This led iconologists to treat fossil remnants as pictures of what they are the remains of. But

something isn't a picture only because someone sees the events in them that caused them. Something is definitely removed from the creature that got fossilised--but this is just what we see looking at the fossil; although those among us not versed in geology may not know how to describe it. Fossils are not images. A corpse in a coffin is not an image of the deceased, nor is the skeleton that results from the processes of decay. We see the deceased as what he has become. Günther von Hagens developed a procedure to remove all animal material from corpses and replace it with plastics: this too does *not* turn a plastinated corpse into an image.[7]

Photos, to sum up, "say" only "this, here, now" without handing out the context that provides these indexicals with content. My core witness for this argument will be the photographed face. Because a photograph's manner of subtraction is physical and chemical, it removes a process that is centrally at work in face-to-face interaction, namely reciprocal addressing.

3 Addressing Faces

Faces cannot normally be observed face-to-face. Of course, we can look at someone and perceive his face, its form and colours, its beauty or ugliness, but this is different from observing it, or him face-to-face. I have done an experiment with my students, asking them to look their neighbour in the eyes and observe their face so as to describe it in detail. Apart from the proverbial head-over-heels couple, they giggle and often refuse to partake in the experiment. That is because face-to-face we meet the other and the other meets us: persons interact and the watching is a mere means for that, and there is no actual way to circumvent the reciprocating. Of course, one could make a photograph of the other's face and that would allow one to describe the other in detail. But why exactly is a photograph so helpful in this respect? We should ask what the photograph is taking away from the face-to-face meeting of persons. I submit that it removes what I call 'the address'.

The question when noticing someone becomes observing them has to do with how the persons watching and being seen experience the situation. I realise that this is not a very satisfactory explanation, neither empirically, nor philosophically. In pointing to some essential bit of human interaction and reciprocal recognition I seem to have withdrawn into subjectivism. This, however, is not the case. The exchanging of facial expressions is a reciprocal process: both interlocutors form essential ingredients to the process, and whether some or other thing has been expressed successfully, depends as much on the intentions of the expresser as on the projections of its empathiser. This constitutes what I think is a thick concept of expression. Without the reciprocal addressing expressions are perceived thinly. The latter should not be the starting point of a philosophical analysis. (I return to the distinction between thick and thin below.)

Pictures, for instance, are from a point of view: in photographs it is clear that the camera cannot be in the picture; it cannot depict itself. The camera is the limit of the world depicted (cf. Wittgenstein 1922 lemma 5.6). The camera that is visible in a photograph of a mirror is not the camera that 'owns' the whole image which includes the mirror. We only happen to know how mirrors work and from this we conclude to be watching the camera that shot the photo.[8]

When a viewer at home feels addressed by someone on television, he realises that the addressing happens through a camera and is not, normally, directed at him personally. How could someone address someone via a camera--and be fully involved in such addressing-- when there are no personal reciprocations to be expected from the addressed? Just as the viewer isn't fully addressed as the person he is, so the addresser in her addressing isn't fully engaged as the person she is.

Troubling examples of failed addressing are: the live footage of the collapsing Heizel stadium, May 29, 1985, where 39 soccer supporters are shown dying--in front of devoted cameramen. Or the World Press Photo 2004, of a woman mourning the death of her loved ones in the tsunami. Should we be watching these people dying and mourning, or should we leave them at it, as these are very intimate kinds of experiences? Ethical objections like these assume that in making a photograph, abstracting from the element of address within the situation, we fail to render their moral space, and harm the depicted (cf. van Gerwen 2002, 175-178.)

My thesis with regard to photographs of people is that they successfully render a moral space only if the people depicted in it are allowed to prove their personhood, as they do in real-life social reciprocity; for instance, by personally addressing the photographer--where this is visible in the photograph. The sacrifice of moral space, I submit, characterises the paradox of the journalistic use of pictures. In no iconic photograph that I know of do the depicted address the photographer. Iconic photographs depict particular scenes but, due to subsequent use get to mean the larger events surrounding these scenes; one horrible scene becomes merely an example of a bigger horrible scene.

The typical snapshot, as well as certain artistic photographs--photos of people by Diane Arbus, William Klein or Rineke Dijkstra--show how the person who is behind the camera and who is by definition excluded from the image might be introduced *in* the picture: by addressing him. The addressing in the depicted gazes betrays the one addressed. Holiday snap shots mostly imply such an individual relation with the photographer. In a photo of my two sons, and two daughters of a friend of mine (see figure 1), all four children can be seen to address the person behind the camera. And viewing the photograph one can make out from their gazes who is the photographer.[9]

Figure 1: My boys, and the daughters of a friend: did my friend or I take the picture?

In the art photos meant above, though, viewers are not induced to project thoughts of the individual persons they portray as with snapshots viewers are. Somehow, in such art photography, these individuals are universalised but not as exemplifying a larger event, like iconic images do, but their own selves. One sees this thought reflected in a remark from Diane Arbus: "The more specific you are, the more general it'll be."[10]

The difference between a snapshot and a universalising art photo may be this that in the latter the addressing is shown to have been central to the photographer's interest, whereas in the former not the addressing but the persons addressing are. Thus, the art photo turns the making of the photo as such into its subject matter, which opens up photography to considerations of individual style, albeit of different kinds from those pertinent to painting.[11]

4 Mirrored Faces

One way to understand the element of address is by looking at how in the mirror we do not see a face that addresses us. Ovid's myth of Narcissus helps us grasp the frustration inhering that event. Narcissus' beauty made everyone in his vicinity fall in love with him, but he could not care less about this. Until, one day, he gazes into a pond and finds his own face looking back at him. Now he understands why the others love him so much, and he, too, falls in love instantly. The fascination for his own appearance is shown beautifully in Caravaggio's rendering of the scene. The story does not end here, though. Most people will know that Narcissus dies from the confrontation with his own appearance, and that his friends do not find anything left afterwards: the boy simply evaporated. Few people know, though, that Narcissus did not die from fascination, but out of frustration. When he recognises the beauty of his own face in the reflection in the pond, he immediately sets out to touch and caress his it. However, no sooner does he touch the surface of the water or his face disappears and distorts. He also finds out that the reflection does not try to caress his real face either. Narcissus' frustration then consists in the powerlessness of the mirrored reflection to personally interact with him. What is found lacking, and hurtfully so, is the reciprocity of address. This is what mirror images in general lack and it explains both our fascination for mirror images and photographs and our frustration about the element of abstraction at work in either. Real-life perception is embedded in polymodal perception, and hence, not abstract; photographs of persons, however, are abstract.[12]

According to Jacques Lacan, a child's identification with its mirror image will be its model for future social identifications. Lacan also thinks that this first self-image entails, for the ego, a turn to fantasy (Lacan 1966, 94). I'd like to venture a different reading of the mirror image.

A mirror image indeed suggests a strange derivative of oneself, something resembling other people in being "a person over there", but one which does not prove by wanton responses to possess a mind. The image moves exactly like the child wants it to do. Yet, the child does not experience himself "out there", but "here". The way it sees the mother in the mirror is much more like the way it sees her directly; in both cases the child sees a person with an embodied mind. But its own body it sees reflected without a similar allocation of the embodied mind. The child experiences its mind subjectively, and not there where it sees its whole body reflected. It thinks it sees in the mirror how it resembles other people. It already knows that other people have a will of their own, because they do not always immediately do as the child wants. If the child would indeed have to infer his own mind by analogy, then that would indeed ground his

self-image in a fantasy. But the mirror-stage is perceptual, not an inference. In my view, the child's "mistake" is in assuming that it sees its own mirror reflection as expressive.

The mirror image does not posses a mind with its own logic. Nor does it indicate the presence of a mind by way of response. Instead, it "does" exactly the same as the child knows himself to be doing. It would be more logical for the child to think that the mirror image forms part of its own body, but wouldn't that fantasy be disturbed as soon as the child touches the cold surface of the glass?

In the mirror image the natural, symptomatic relation of the expression with the expressed is broken, even more so than in photographs, as these do present a person like one would meet in everyday life, i.e. with a mind separate from that of the viewer. Whereas the schism between expression and expressed typical of a mirror image is in the subject's effort to view his reflected self as a distinct other, in photographs the schism is between a truly distinct other, as depicted, and the viewer. Whereas in one's mirror image one is incapable to access one's own mind as out there in the reflection, in the photograph it is the interaction between the viewer and the other that is all but removed. It is, indeed, instructive to compare a photograph to a mirror image, more so than to a view from a window, as Scruton (1983) would have it. The mind that one perceives in another person is "there" where one sees the body only in cases of direct perception (whether or not through a window). This is neither the case with photographs nor with mirror images. René Magritte supports this view, with his painting, "La Réproduction Interdite", which shows a man looking in the mirror to see … his back side reflected in it.[13]

The self-portraits most interesting in the present context are those where the depicted person is the one who made the image after his own perception of a live reflection in the mirror. The viewer of the portrait sees what its maker saw of himself--perceptually, without the intervening of foreign devices like language, another person, a fantasy or a camera.

To repeat, taking your own photograph is done without requiring you (the photographer) to *perceptually* understand the face you are portraying (yours), because you already know internally what it is expressing. Whereas one cannot paint one's mirrored face as expressing anything but bewilderment about the absence of expression, one can photograph one's face looking longingly in the distance, looking inwardly pensive, looking happily about the prospect of a nice event, etc. Here the camera makes the image, not the embodied person whom the photograph portrays. One will know how to present one's face to a camera for some particular expression--as long as one doesn't have to check it in the mirror.[14] The challenge that confronts the painter is different altogether, because it is to do with what he sees in the mirror: and this is very unlike the self that others see him as, not a human body with a full expressive repertoire. To be sure: a photograph is not a frozen mirror image.

5. Depicted Moral Space

The effort to pictorially render the moral space is typical of traditional, pre-modern art. It shows nicely in an example where we feel that it fails: Caravaggio's "The Card Sharks".[15] We see, in this painting, how the man standing is not looking at the left boy's cards, but rather at the boy's back. It seems unlikely that this was how Caravaggio meant this picture to tell its story. As it also seems unlikely that the recurrence of one model in two places was meant to be part of the story in the painting. The two boys who sit at the table happen to be the same model.[16] The example illustrates our expectations with regard to such realistic pictures: that they render a moral space, where people interact. Art is concerned with this moral space and always has

been.

Iconic photographs seem to depict the moral space of the depicted persons, but they do so in some universalised manner, not by making the moral space real for the viewer, but by inducing the viewer to entertain its mere concept to make it stand for an époque. The Vietnamese girl's suffering, in Nick Ut's (1972) photograph, is sacrificed for her to exemplify the horrors of the Viet Nam war. With iconic pictures, the abstraction from the addressing within the scene is excused for the sake of larger aims. But iconic photos entertain troubled relationships with morality. They may easily summon moral thoughts in their viewers, but achieve this by tampering with the moral aspect of what they depict.17

Other types of problematic pictures would be sentimental portraits. These provide their viewers with an observational truth about the emotions they supposedly depict: one sees the tears on the cheeks and hence *knows* the depicted is in grief. The reason for calling these pictures sentimental is to do with their failure to also bring the depicted expression to life. Depicted expression can be said to succeed thickly only if it entails an element of address rewarded by certain projections. Bernard Williams (1985) distinguished thick from thin *concepts* on the basis of the surfacing of a reason to act.18 I submit that the impetus to act according to the property perceived makes the *use* of the relevant term a thick one. Some concepts, such as "coward", "lie", "brutality", "gratitude", mentioned by Williams, are characterised by their thick use, but others can be used both thickly and thinly, and pictures can as well. In case of pictures meant to convey moral space thickly, we are talking about the addition of a projective element.

A similar distinction hovers over the discussion in Benjamin Tilghman (1988) of Frank Stella's effort to rescue abstract art from flatness by introducing volume in it. Tilghman argues that mere volume would not suffice for this rescuing operation, and concludes that the space which plays a role in paintings is not empty as a theatre stage is. Instead, it is a space created by the people depicted whilst interacting. The space is at the same time also a psychological and dramatic space. Tilghman's point is important, but he misses the insight that the representation of the experiential, or the expression, thickly conceived, is achieved through intimation, not merely by 'thin' resemblance. He remarks:

"As elements of human action we are not dealing simply with 'movements', but with gestures, postures, facial expressions, and the like that are already replete with the human character, intention, and purpose." (Tilghman 1988, 322).

People's gestures are replete of human aspects, but this is not necessarily also true of their depiction. The following quote of Wittgenstein concerns a certain staticness of pictures, next to their permeability to thought, that we saw in Wollheim's discussion of prompting with the ruined landscape painting, above:

> I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do I do if I take the smile now as a kind one, now as malicious? Don't I often imagine it with a spatial and temporal context which is one either of kindness or malice? Thus I might supply the picture with the fancy that the smiler was smiling down on a child at play, or again on the suffering of an enemy (Wittgenstein 1953, 145:539, quoted in Tilghman 1988, 322).

The fancy supplied would have to fit the smile and some reciprocal recognition would account for its appropriateness. Wittgenstein, too, it seems to me, is referring to a thick concept of smile, i.e. a view of smiles as embedded in short-term histories and futures of intentional agency, smiles in a moral space. He certainly is sensitive to the peculiarities of pictures of smiles:

> A picture must be good even if you look at it upside down. Then, the smile won't be noticeable.(Wittgenstein 1938-1946, 35).

You would not want to respond to an upside down smile by smiling like you would to any normal smile. If you recognise the smile to begin with, that recognition would at best be thin, and merely classificatory: you might be able to make out that it is a smile and not a saddened face, but won't be able to take into account the whole moral embedding, or feel the need to respond to it.

We assume that photos represent the moral space of human interactions--this explains our enthusiasm for photography, and for film--but how does a viewer make thick sense of the exchange of gazes, if they are not directed at her or in case they are: via a camera? Photos don't easily depict the exchanging of gazes thickly--the addressing in that--and this is because pictures are not equipped to do that.

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1. Roger Scruton (1983) seems to argue that a photograph is not, thus, recognised as a picture because we see the object straight through it. Though this captures the thought that it is not its causal origin which explains what we see in a photograph, it does so by overstating what we see as though what we see is the thing photographed itself. The notion of the non-egocentricity of one's perception of pictures, including photographs, elaborated by Greg Currie (1998, 72-74), is meant to correct this. Dominic Lopes (2003), too, thinks that we can appreciate a photograph qua photograph, but he refers to manipulations the nature of which moves the result away from Scruton's "ideal photo".

2. I view these anticipations as integral to their perception and not as a product of typical games of make-believe played with representations, *pace* Walton (1990).

3. René Magritte. "La Condition Humaine". 1933. The National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC, USA.

4. See Alva Noë's account of perception as enacted; the notion of affordances is from J.J. Gibson (1986); and see McDowell (1994, 341) for the view of perception as of an organism, instead of of sub-organic brain modules. And see elaborate discussions in Gendler and Hawthorne (2006).

5. The psychological power of seeing-in involves such anticipatory perception as well, though it may remain neutral to it, as I argued in Van Gerwen (2001).

6. I am grateful to Marjolein Efting Dijkstra for this example.

7. Some of van Hagens' "Ganzkörper" plastinations were formed not to instructed the anatomy lesson, but to resemble cubist works of art. One might want to think in this context whether corpses may be used like this to produce works of art. I submit that plastinated human corpses cannot become art because the moral aspect of corpses cannot be "removed".

8. A similar infelicitous case would be Diego Velazquez who in "Las Meninas" purportedly shows himself while painting "Las Meninas". The paradox here is intellectual, not perceptual.

9. Spoiler: The girls are more clearly at ease with the photographer than my sons.

10. Arbus (2003, 141), from a 1971 lecture by Arbus: "It was my teacher, Lisette Model, who finally made it clear to me that the more specific you are, the more general it'll be". Thanks to David Davies for the reference.

11. This qualifies Scruton's thesis that photos are not art because they cannot present a vision onto their content (in Scruton 1983), as much as Lopes's claim that photographs do involve material manipulation and can for that reason be art (Lopes 2003). For the kinds of consideration pertinent to painting, see Wollheim 1993.

12. An abstract image of people, depicting a type of person, instead of a token one, as used in anthropology encyclopaedias, for instance, can best be characterised as one whose viewer is aware of an added incapacity to interact with the depicted because of some added flatness.

13. René Magritte: La Réproduction Interdite, 1937-39, Boymans van Beuningen, Rotterdam.

14. One would be "lying" if one painted one's mirrored face as expressing anything but bewilderment about the absence of expression—assuming the painter is trying to capture in paint what he sees before him. This may be ignored if one takes these self-portraits from a semiotic or iconic point of view as presenting an image intentionally constructed by the painter. Though I recognise that painters may intentionally manipulate the image in the painting such paintings or their analysis is not my concern. For an extensive treatment from this point of view, see Cumming (2009).

15. Ca. 1594, Kimbell Art Museum, Fort Worth, Texas.

16. David Hockney (2002) has said many memorable things about the process which supposedly caused Caravaggio to fail in getting the man's gaze right. In a reconstruction of The Card Sharks Hockney showed how the lens Caravaggio used would project only part of the scene onto the canvas, requiring him to place the next character on the stage to make sure his reflection would fall in the right spot on the canvas. Instead of adapting the reflection by staging the models, the sheer fact that he used one model for both of the players, indicates that he may have used the same spot on the stage for him, whilst moving the canvas to catch his reflections in the right place. Thus, each model would in reality be gazing at an empty space and Caravaggio's challenge would consist in painting his characters as if they were gazing as depicted on the canvas. Another example of a painting constructed of multiple projections is Anton Van Dyck's portrait of "Marchesa Brinole-

Sale with her Son" (1626, Washington, The National Gallery of Art), with its awkward proportions: it seems as though we look from the bottom up, but in fact see her face, as well as her son's, frontally; the woman's body is enormous: if she were to get up, she would measure three to four metres. It is hardly possible for the two figures to have posed at the same moment holding hands as they are depicted doing. According to Hockney we see multiple viewing points in this painting.

<u>17.</u> Péter Forgács, in recognition of this problem, uses home movies to tell the devastating tale of Hungarian Jews, in *Free Fall--Private Hungary* (1996).

<u>18.</u> "If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a reason to act, though that reason need not be a decisive one and may be outweighed by other reasons [...]", Williams (1985, 140). Cf. Bonzon (2009), for a discussion that seems at times to thrive on the ambiguity between thick and thin terms and thick and thin uses of terms. And see Geertz (1994) for an application to historiography and anthropology.

Links:
[1] http://www.phil.uu.nl/%7Erob